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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
decided, however. It still may be possible that a contractor, suing on
a contract where the defendant could prove wilful departure, might
be barred from any recovery in the absence of a cross bill, at least under
state procedure; but the tide appears to be running against such results.
Balancing the damages sustained by each party is the concept now
dominating the courts' considerations, and the instant case is a good
example of the trend.
William C. Cowardin, Jr.
Contracts-Agency-RIGHT TO COMMISSION: The respondent, George
H. Engeman, a real estate broker, entered into a "Sales Agreement" with
Grace and Aubrey Hummer on August 21, 1959 whereby Engeman
was granted an exclusive right to sell the Hummers' farm. The agency
was to be effective for a thirty-day period and then become terminable
at will upon ten days' prior notice in writing. In accordance with the
agreement, the broker initiated his efforts to sell the farm by con-
tacting his "best clients," showing the property to prospective buyers,
and advertising its availability by "word of mouth." On August 29,
he submitted a signed contract which he had obtained from one Noyes,
but Hummer rejected the agreement, on the advice of his attorney,
since the terms of the proposed sale had been altered.
Shortly thereafter Hummer sent Engeman notice that the agency had
been revoked and subsequently sold the farm himself, whereupon the
broker brought an action for his commission. In an amended pleading,
Engeman alleged that the listing agreement was valid and that the ex-
clusive agreement had made such irrevocable until expiration of the
thirty-day period stated therein. In substance, he contended that Hum-
mer had become liable for the sum requested, by invoking his power to
terminate the agency when he had relinquished his right to exercise it
under the "Sales Agreement" listing his farm.'
The trial judge, upon hearing the arguments of counsel, stated that
no issue of fact had been presented for determination by the jury
and entered judgment for the plaintiff, as a matter of law, in the amount
of the commission. Following the court's denial of a motion to have
a jury impaneled to assess damages, the defendants appealed from the
order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.2
1. Piper v. Wells, 175 Md. 326, 2 A.2d 28 (1938).
2. Hummer v. Engernan, 206 Va. 102, 141 S.E.2d 716 (1965).
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Reviewing the decision entered below, the court ruled that the trial
court erred as to Hummer's right to revoke the agency and that having
done so he was not liable upon the listing. The holding expressed the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' view that such a listing agreement
was without consideration and consequently terminable at will regard-
less of the tenure specified. "Nowhere in the agreement did plaintiff
promise to perform or not perform." 3 Thus, the listing agreement was
construed as a unilateral contract, the acceptance of which is only exe-
cuted by performance of the act, namely the procurement of a pur-
chaser by the broker.4
It was found that Engeman's negotiations with the prospective buyer,
Noyes, were immaterial since by altering the terms of the proposed sale
he failed to complete his undertaking as instructed so as to constitute
performance.5 Adhering to the principle of strict construction of uni-
lateral contracts and relying on the contractual doctrine of considera-
tion, the court reasoned that such "Sales Agreements" lack mutuality
of obligation and are therefore unenforceable." By applying this ap-
proach, the appellate court adopted the view that mere performance
of the acts of a broker is contemplated to do for his own benefit so as
to interest potential buyers is insufficient to make the agency irrevo-
cable.7
However, other courts have either modified this stand under similar
factual situations or wholly rejected it, treating "the exclusive agree-
ment as if it were a catalyst, capable of changing a contract, unilateral
in form into a bilateral one." s The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
in two previous decisions, had held that listing agreements were bilateral,
Morris v. Bragg and Wilson v. Brown,0 but they are distinguished on
the basis of their recitals of the consideration. Both contracts provided
3. Hummer v. Engeman, supra note 2, at 719.
4. Bartlett v. Keith, 325 Mass. 265, 90 N.E.2d 308 (1950); Stensgaard v. Smith, 43
Minn. 11, 44 N.W. 669 (1890).
5. MEcHEM, AGENCY § 965 (1889).
6. For discussibn see 12 AM. JuR. 2d Brokers § 32 (1964).
7. Cronin v. American Securities Co, 163 Ala. 533, 50 So. 915 (1909); Des Rivieres
v. Sullivan, 247 Mass. 433, 142 N.E. 111 (1924); Baird v. Lewis, 229 Miss. 61, 90 So.
2d 184 (1956); Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Vt. 314, 208 Pac. 526 (1922).
8. Baumgarten v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505 (1954); Braniff v. Blair, 101 Kan. 117,
165 Pac. 816 (1917); Chamberlain v. Grisham, 360 Mo. 655, 230 S.W.2d 721 (1950): See
also 30 FORDHAM L. Rav. 147.
9. 155 Va. 912, 156 S.E. 381 (1931): The contract here stated that the agency was
given "in consideration of your efforts to find a purchaser".
10. 136 Va. 634, 118 S.E. 88 (1923): The contract here stated that the agency was
given "for the consideration of advertising and making reasonable efforts to sell".
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that the efforts of the real estate agent should support the promises of
the owner.
A contrary result was reached by the Georgia Court of Appeals
which implied the presence of statements to this effect and held that
where a broker expends time and effort endeavoring to effect a sale
pursuant to his employment by the owner, the listing ripens into a
bilateral contract by the agent's expenditure of his physical and fiscal
exertion to find a buyer.1 The mere attendance of a recital of some
fixed time limitation has produced holdings that such agreements are
irrevocable during that period.12
The characterization of listing agreements as bilateral contracts has
been based upon numerous theories.' 3  The most significant of these
being:
(1) because the broker has incurred a detriment' 4;
(2) estoppel'5;
(3) because the owner has agreed to a restriction of his right of
revocation 6;
(4) the beginning of performance forms the contract 7 ; and
(5) conditional rights and duties are created by part performance.' 8
Often the particular basis for a decision cannot be determined since
the views obviously overlap. The departure from the theoretical man-
dates of the doctrine of consideration is not ignored but such inconsis-
tency is justified by declaring that they are "outweighed by considera-
tions of practical justice." 19
A course between the approaches related by the preceding might
11. Thornton v. Lewis, 106 Ga. 328, 126 SZE.2d 869 (1962).
12. Jones v. Hollander, 3 NJ. Misc. 973, 130 Ad. 451 (1925); Pickett v. Bishop, 148
Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d 222 (1949); Wright v. Vernon, 81 Cal. App. 2d 346, 183 P.2d 908
(1947).
13. For discussion and authorities cited therein see Wallace, Promissory Liability
Under Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 38 IowA L. REv. 350 (1952).
14. Thompson v. Hudson, 76 Ga. App. 807, 47 S.E.2d 112 (1948); Piper v. Wells, 175
Md. 326, 2 A.2d 28 (1938).
15. Oregon Home Builders v. Crowley, 87 Ore. 517, 170 Pac. 718 (1918).
16. Rowan Co. v. Hull, 55 W.Va. 335, 47 S.E. 92 (1904); Cloe v. Rogers, 31 Okla.
255, 121 Pac. 201 (1912).
17. John E. DeWolf Co. v. Harvey, 161 Wis. 535, 154 N.W. 988 (1915); Braniff
v. Baier, 101 Kan. 117, 165 Pac. 816 (1917).
18. Baker v. Howison, 213 Ala. 41, 104 So. 239 (1925); Kimmell v. Skelly, 130 Cal.
555, 62 Pac. 1067 (1900).
19. Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., 31 Tenn. App. 494, 217 S.W.2d 10
(1946): See also, Hughes v. Bickley, 205 Ala. 619, 89 So.33 (1921).
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quite possibly prove to satisfy this end while preserving the reliability
of strict contract law. The Illinois Court of Appeals in Pretzel v. Ander-
son20 achieved such by stating that the owner had both the right and
the power to terminate the agency without liability, but if the broker
proved a certain sum of money or energy expended in the attempt to
sell prior to the revocation he might recover on the basis of quantum
meruit. Thereby the principles of law were not sacrificed and a remedy
,was given in equity where one was necessary but none was provided
by law.
The decision in Hummer v. Engeman, as recited by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, does not preclude a quantum meruit re-
covery per se but makes no mention of its availablity to the broker.
The failure of the respondent to raise this issue may well explain the
omission of this point in the court's opinion, yet a statement in this
regard, even in the form of dicta, would have done much to clarify
and define the nature of listing agreements. "It is for the law to recog-
nize an obligation as arising from a promise as soon as justice requires." 2 1
By leaving the obvious question unanswered, Hummer v. Engeman
falls short.
Robert P. Wolf
Contracts-THE PAROL EvIDENCE RULE-EXCEPTIONS; THE PARTIAL
INTEGRATION AND COLLATERAL CONTRACTS DOCTRINES. Plaintiff, George
L. Durham, brought an action for damages for breach of an alleged
oral indemnification contract against the National Pool Equipment
Company of Virginia, defendant. This alleged contract concerned the
maximum cost of a swimming pool constructed for the plaintiff's motel
by the defendant. The defendant denied the allegation concerning the
oral contract. The defendant, in turn, contended that the entire agree-
ment between the parties was embodied in two written contracts. The
trial court struck the plaintiff's evidence concerning the oral contract
upon the defendant's motion. The lower court said the oral agreement
was "completely inconsistent" with the written contracts and inadmis-
sible because of the parol evidence rule. The plaintiff excepted to the
striking of this evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia up-
held the plaintiff's contention that the parol evidence rule did not apply
20. 162 1M. App. 538 (1911).
21. Balantine, Acceptance of Offers For Unilateral Contracts by Partial Performance
of Service Requested, 5 MINN. L. REv. 94 (1921).
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